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“This is the sort of modernity that made us ill, - we grew sick on
lazy peace, cowardly compromise, the whole virtuous filth of the modern
Yes and No.”
-- Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Antichrist”
After the defeat of the Napoleonic Empire, most Central European nations
embarked on a quest for sovereignty and freedom (from foreign
oppressors). This quest most often manifested itself in a pathological
glorification of one’s own people, disregarding the fact that the
propagators of this new kind of nationalism implied that it was merely a
common language that constituted one’s nation – thereby completely
disregarding or ignoring the ethnic bonds various nations shared with
each other (for example, Germany and France – both once ruled by one
emperor, Charlemagne or Karl). This kind of silliness certainly
contributed a large amount of artificially created (stirred up by
self-proclaimed elitists within the respective nations) hostility
between once mutually tolerant European neighbors. One could argue that
the fratricidal war of 1914-1918 was a direct result of the various
European states’ unchaining themselves from Napoleon’s benevolent
yoke.
As Michael Stuermer writes in “The German Empire,” “Altogether,
the political and social revolutions of 1848 and the industrial
revolution had challenged the old established order of state and
society” (23). Obviously, this statement implies – quite correctly
– that the so-called “revolutionary” (“reactionary” would be a
more adequate term, meaning that the “new nationalists” tried to
feed off the ideological chaos that was unleashed by the French
Revolution with its guillotine-terror) nationalist movement in the
German states was essentially nothing more than a destructive outbreak
of jingoistic emotions – fuelled by the fires of perceived resentment
against “stronger” and more unified neighbors (such as France or
Austria-Hungary). Naturally, one has to keep in mind that “the
shockwaves of the French Revolution and Napoleon” (Stuermer 23) were
the initial trigger moments in that all-pervasive European rebellion
against the established natural order of things (the term “natural”
connoting “traditional”).
Matthew Levinger argues in “Enlightened Nationalism” that
“numerous historians have observed that bourgeois popular nationalism
in nineteenth-century Germany strongly emphasized the importance of
collective solidarity within the nation” (100). This quote sums up the
quite ludicrous notion that such an abstract concept as “collective
solidarity” even existed in a group that defined its cohesiveness on a
purely linguistic base. One has to keep in mind that language (as a
concept) is flexible and far from concrete – some German dialects,
such as “plattdeutsch” in the far north, could even be considered
closer to Dutch than High German. Basing a feeling (intellectually
concocted, no doubt) of mutual affection between members of the same
“nation” on their linguistic affinities seems therefore a bit
far-fetched.
Considering that most Germans were of the lower or middle classes of
society, it is not surprising that the Prussian King decided to ignore
the ignoble nationalist rants made at the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848.
After all, how could society not suffer with the implementation of the
revolutionaries’ demands? European life had already deteriorated
enough through a series of bloody battles whose outcome was nothing less
than a complete re-organization of the continent in favor of the petty
(nationalist) forces that Napoleon (who triggered the martial campaigns
in first place) tried to dismantle by becoming undisputed ruler of
Central Europe. If the Prussian King had acquiesced and accepted the
arrogant demands of the petty rabble in Frankfurt, he would have opened
the door to all kinds of (essentially proto-Bolshevist) measures that
would have been implemented to undermine the divine authority of the
crown and the blessed rule of the various estates.
One of the measures that most (romantically inclined) nationalists in
Germany wanted to see installed was the equalization of all people in
the German-speaking realm under the autocratic rule of self-proclaimed
“representatives” of the people (in a parliament where the will of
the people was supposed to be represented). A prime example of this
egalitarian madness is Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s “Turner
Gesellschaft.” Levinger argues that this movement “was intended to
function as a public spectacle, as a festival that would constitute the
nation as a fraternity of equals” (107). It goes without saying that
Jahn’s pipe-dream was just that – a dream, or maybe even a vision of
megalomaniacal proportions (reflecting Jahn’s own aspirations, meaning
his inflated sense of self-identification with the ideal [both
physically and mentally] “German,” onto an entire people – in this
case, the German “Volk,” an organism that was supposed to be
cohesive and like-minded).
Stuermer exposes the lyrics of Hoffmann von Fallersleben’s poem,
“Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles” (“Germany, Germany above
all”), for what they really were – namely, “pure German idealism:
the idea that Germany, an open and just society lubricated by Riesling
[a fine wine, really], full of song and beautiful German womanhood,
should reign supreme over the 38 or so sovereignties loosely united in
the German Confederation…” (16) What Stuermer forgets to mention is
that this kind of “German idealism” was the ideal breeding ground
for an inverted sense of nationhood – the notion that the people,
allegedly “equal” and ecstatic in an alcohol-fuelled paradise, would
happily cooperate in any task that was set before them. In contrast, the
traditional notion of a nation was based on the ideal of a “universal
hierarchy,” meaning that people essentially were NOT equal, and that
they therefore deserved to be put in their naturally assigned place (by
birth).
Levinger argues that the world view of the romantic nationalists was
deeply entrenched in irrational religious fervor. He states that
“rather than articulating secular ideals, they presented an expressly
Christian – and specifically Protestant pietist – vision of the
national community” (98). This, of course, coincides with the argument
that the German nationalists were – in essence – nothing more than
illusionists, obsessed with an imagined “grande” idea and encouraged
by their own pre-conceived notions of Levantine spirituality. It is
therefore quite obvious that the nationalists’ aspirations were
diametrically opposed to the welfare of the people as a whole. One
cannot blame the nationalists for this faux pas, however, since their
belief system must have been rather deeply engrained. Hence, one could
argue that their failings were unintentional ones since they were
indoctrinated by society itself to believe that Christianity is
ideologically compatible with the German (or European) character.
On the other hand, Stuermer states that throughout “Europe the
reaction to Napoleon’s conquest was to be the rise of modern
nationalism as a means to reconstitute society and to give expression to
popular forces” (15). One must wonder what exactly was “modern”
about the rise of nationalism in Germany when one reviews the backward
nature of the revolutionaries’ outlook. The propagation of an alien
religion (Christianity, essentially a desert religion) certainly does
not seem to be an adequate asset of modernity. This kind of mentality
breeds nothing but a reversal in the role that civilization is usually
ascribed to (an arbiter of progress). If the romantic nationalists
thought that the wholesale introduction of religious fervor would breed
sentimental sentiments regarding one’s “Volk,” they might have
been right, considering that the masses in Germany actually DID
subscribe to the religion that worships a (probably fictitious) man
nailed to a stick. It is only in hindsight that it becomes apparent that
this kind of nationalism was paving a one-way path to spiritual (in the
indigenous/European sense) annihilation, and therefore the soul of the
“Volk” was lured into a limbo of passive acceptance (of the status
quo).
According to Levinger, “popular nationalism was an overwhelmingly
urban phenomenon” (100). This shows that the adherents of the
nationalist ideology were hardly in the position to speak for the German
people as a whole. After all, how could urban admonishers (as the
nationalists undoubtedly were) be in the position to speak for the
majority that dwelt in the countryside? The true/qualified propagandists
of “blood and soil” could only have been the ones that were
agriculturally involved, but this segment of society did not bother with
the intellectual gymnastics that the “educated” town-dwelling
nationalists were preoccupied with.
It is safe to assume that the nationalist movement in Germany was
nothing more than an outbreak of the same kind of radical elements that
the European powers had such problems in dealing with after Robespierre
cut off all those heads (of the French elite). One does not need to take
a huge leap in trying to imagine what the world would look like today if
the nationalists would not have succeeded in implementing their mad
desire for “home rule.” As Stuermer says, “Both the French
Revolution and the ‘wars of liberation,’ as the uprising against
Napoleon was called, gave a boost to revolutionary idealism” (15). It
is certainly fitting that Stuermer puts the “wars of liberation” in
quotation marks since the term itself exudes a significant amount of
irony. The real liberator of Europe was Napoleon, in the sense that he
tried to unite the continent and therefore make it indefinitely stronger
and eventually more just (with the ruthless implementation of the
Napoleonic Code). The “revolutionary idealists,” however, were
nothing but a band of rascals that tried to cash in on the results of
the failed experiment of the once glorious French Emperor.
Bibliography
Levinger, Matthew. “Enlightened Nationalism.” Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Stuermer, Michael. “The German Empire.” New York: Random House,
2000.
- Constantin von Hoffmeister
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